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Abstract
In a dynamic economy, money provides liquidity as a medium of exchange.
A central bank that sets the nominal rate of interest and distributes its profit
to shareholders as dividends is traded in the asset market. A nominal rates of
interest that tend to zero, but do not vanish, eliminate equilibrium allocations
that do not converge to a Pareto optimal allocation.
Key words: nominal rate of interest; dynamic efficiency.
JEL classification numbers: D-60; E-10.
1 Introduction
The Pareto optimality of competitive equilibrium allocations is a major tenet
of classical welfare economics and the main argument in favor of compet-
itive markets for the allocation of resources. Deviations from the classical
paradigm sever the link between Pareto optimal and competitive equilibrium
allocations, with repercussions both for the theory and practice of economic
policy.
Competitive equilibrium allocations may fall short of Pareto optimality
in two distinct, if related, situations: (i) in economies that extend over an in-
finite horizon with a demographic structure of overlapping generations (Gale
(1973), Samuelson (1958)) and (ii) in economies with an operative transac-
tions technology with money that provides liquidity services as a medium of
exchange (Clower (1967), Lucas and Stokey (1987))1.
The dynamic failure of optimality in economies of overlapping generations
is well understood: competitive prices that attain market clearing may fail to
provide consistent accounting over infinite streams of output. Long-lived pro-
ductive assets, with streams of output that extend to the infinite future, when
traded in asset markets, guarantee that equilibrium prices provide consistent
intertemporal valuation and restore the optimality of competitive allocations
(Wilson (1981), Santos and Woodford (1997)).
When money serves as a medium of exchange, the nominal rate of interest
does not allow competitive prices to exhaust the static gains from trade.
Vanishing nominal rates of interest or, equivalently, the payment of interest
on money balances on par with the rate of return on alternative stores of value
eliminates the suboptimality of monetary equilibria (Friedman (1969)).
The argument here is that low, but not vanishing, nominal rates of inter-
est shield the economy from intertemporal suboptimality at the cost of some
static inefficiency. Differently from other arguments for a positive nominal
interest, the argument does not appeal to nominal rigidities, imperfect com-
petition or any other imperfection or incompleteness of financial markets.
In an economy of overlapping generations with cash-in-advance constraints,
a central bank issues balances in exchange for bonds and distributes its prof-
its, seignorage, as dividends to shareholders Bloise, Dre`ze, and Polemar-
chakis (2005), Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005)). Importantly, shares to
the bank are traded in the asset market and the bank is, initially, owned
by a finite number of individuals, most simply among those active at the
1Search theoretic models of monetary economies (Diamond (1984) or Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989)) are, evidently, more satisfactory, but the simple cash-in-advance formula-
tion here, as in much of the literature, offers analytical tractability and does not play an
otherwise important role in the argument argument.
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starting date of economic activity. Even if not common practice, trades in
shares of the centrak bank is not without precedent: shares of the Bank of
England were traded until 1946. And it is correct and explicit accounting
for the market in shares (Dre`ze and Polemarchakis (2000)) that has allowed
recent formulations to resolve a conundrum (Hahn (1965)) and establish the
existence of monetary equilibria even over a finite horizon.
At equilibrium, the market value of the bank is at least equal to the
present value of seignorage. Seignorage corresponds to the intertemporal
value of net transactions, which is, thus, finite. A condition of intra-generatio-
nal heterogeneity ensures gains to trade even at intergenerational autarky,
which guarantees that, provided that the nominal interest is small enough,
some commodities are non-negligibly traded over the entire infinite horizon.
As net transactions are finitely valued, so is the aggregate endowment of non-
negligibly traded commodities. And, as a consequence, the aggregate endow-
ment is finitely valued at equilibrium, for, otherwise, the relative prices of
negligibly traded to non-negligibly traded commodities would explode across
periods of trade.
As long as the nominal rate of interest is arbitrarily low, but bounded
away from zero, the static inefficiency associated with non-vanishing nominal
rates remains but is essentially negligible; more importantly, with the stream
of seignorage bounded away from zero, the bank substitutes for the long-lived
productive assets that guarantee intertemporal optimality.
In Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006) we gave an argument for the very
special case of a simple economy of overlapping generations.
The connection between costly transactions and intertemporal efficiency
was recognized in Weiss (1980); the argument there, however, was restricted
to steady-state allocations and relied on real balances entering directly the
utility functions of individuals with a positive marginal utility everywhere.
The argument identified debt with money balances and, more importantly,
it did not ensure dynamic efficiency of non-stationary equilibrium allocation.
We organize the development of the argument as follows: In section 2, we
give simple examples that illustrate the argument. In section 3, we present
the argument in abstract terms, at a level of generality that is compara-
ble to that of Wilson (1981). This only requires the modification of budget
constraints of individuals that is inherited from a primitive description of
sequential trades through cash-in-advance constraints. We prove the result
under a hypothesis of gains to trade that we show (in section 4) to be gener-
ically satisfied in standard stationary economies of overlapping generations
with intra-generational heterogeneity. In section 4, we describe a monetary
economy of overlapping generations with cash-in-advance constraints where
a central bank, whose ownership is sequentially traded in the stock market,
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pegs the nominal rate of interest, accommodates the demand for balances and
distributes the seignorage to shareholders as dividends. Not surprisingly, a
canonical intertemporal consolidation of sequential budget constraints reveals
that relevant equilibrium restrictions of this sequential economy are exactly
those in the abstract analysis. We conclude with some remarks. 2
2 Examples
Simple, stationary economies of overlapping generations illustrate the argu-
ment.3 Dates or periods of trade are T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t, . . .}. Each non-initial
generation has a life span of two periods and consists of two individuals,
i ∈ J = {a, b}. An initially old generation is active at t = 0.
2.1
One commodity is exchanged and consumed at each date; the commodity is
perishable.
The intertemporal utility function of an individual is
ui(xi, zi) = xi + ln zi,
where xi is the excess consumptions of the individual when young, while zi
is the consumption when old.
The endowment of an individual when old is ei > 0 — with quasi linear
preferences, it is not necessary to specify the endowment when the individual
is young, when a sufficiently large endowment guarantees positive consump-
tion.
The spot price of the commodity is pt.
Nominal bonds, bt, of one period maturity, serve to transfer revenue across
dates.
The nominal rate of interest is rt ≥ 0.
Balances, mt, provide liquidity services; they also serve as a store of value,
but they are dominated as such by bonds.
At each date, a central bank or monetary authority issues bonds in ex-
change of balances, with
1
1 + rt
bt +mt = 0,
2A reader might prefer to reverse the order of presentation we chose by reading section
4 before section 3. This creates no difficulty, after a preliminary reading of the beginning
of section 3 for the notation we use.
3Minor changes of notation from the abstract argument that follows facilitate the ex-
position
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that it redeems at the following date, earning seignorage
bt +mt = rtmt
at date t+ 1, that it distributes as dividend to shareholders.
Shares to the bank, their number normalised to one, are traded at each
date and serve as a store of value. In the absence of uncertainty, no-arbitrage
requires that the returns to bonds and shares coincide, and as a consequence,
the cum dividend price of shares, vt, satisfies
vt =
rt
1 + rt
mt +
1
1 + rt
vt+1;
if it is finite,
v0 =
r0
1 + r0
m0 +
∞∑
t=1
1
1 + rt−1
(
rt
1 + rt
mt),
where
(1 + rt) = (1 + r0)× . . .× (1 + rt), t = 1, . . . .
The rate of inflation is pit+1 = (pt+1/pt)− 1, and the real rate of interest
is ρt+1 = [(1 + rt+1)/(1 + pit+1)]− 1; real balances are µt = mt/pt.
An individual, young at t, faces the budget constraints
ptx
i
t +
1
1+rt
bit +m
i
t ≤ 0,
pt+1z
i
t+1 ≤ bit +mit + pt+1ei
and the cash in advance constraint 4
mit ≥ ptxi−t , mit ≥ 0.
Equivalently, an individual faces the intertemporal budget constraint
xit +
rt
1 + rt
xi−t +
1
1 + ρt
(zit+1 − ei) ≤ 0,
with
µit ≥ xi−t , µit ≥ 0
the associated holdings of real balances.
Similarly, the cum dividend price of shares in real terms ϕt, satisfies
ϕt =
rt
1 + rt
µt +
1
1 + ρt
ϕt+1;
4x−i is the negative part of x.
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if it is finite,
ϕ0 =
r0
1 + r0
µ0 +
∞∑
t=1
1
1 + ρt−1
(
rt
1 + rt
µt),
where
(1 + ρt) = (1 + ρ0)× . . .× (1 + ρt), t = 1, . . . .
Since shares and bonds are perfect substitutes, it is not necessary either
to introduce shares explicitly in the intertemporal optimization of individuals
or to distinguish between the initial value of the bank, v0, and debt held by
the initially old.
With ea  eb, along any equilibrium path, xat < 0, while xbt > 0.
The solutions to the optimization problems of individuals are
xat (ρt) =
1
(1+ρt)(1−θt)e
a − 1 ≤ 0, zat+1(ρt) = (1 + ρt)(1− θt),
µat (ρt) = −xat ,
and
xbt(ρt) =
1
(1+ρt)
eb − 1 ≥ 0, zbt+1(ρt) = (1 + ρt),
µbt(ρt) = 0,
where, θt = [rt/(1 + rt)] < 1.
Along an equilibrium path,
xat + x
b
t + z
a
t + z
b
t = e,
where e = ea + eb is the aggregate endowment of individuals when old.
With rt = r ≥ 0, and, as a consequence, θt = θ, an equilibrium path of
real rates of interest satisfies
ρt+1 =
e(1− θ) + θea
(1− θ)(e− (2− θ)ρt + θ) − 1,
where
e = ea + eb < 2
is the aggregate endowment of individuals at the second date in their life
spans.
If r = 0, there exist two steady-states, one with ρ∗ = 0 and another with
ρ¯ = (e/2)− 1 < 0; in addition, there is a continuum of non-stationary paths
indexed by the initial real rate of interest, ρ0 ∈ (ρ¯, ρ∗). The steady-state path
with ρ∗ = 0, the golden rule, supports a Pareto optimal allocation, while all
other equilibrium paths support suboptimal and Pareto ranked allocations;
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ρ¯ = (e/2) − 1 < 0 support intergenerational autarky. Note that, at the
autarkic equilibrium, x¯a = (4ea − e2)/(2e) < 0, and, as a consequence, the
associated real balances that support the equilibrium are µ¯ = −x¯a > 0.
If r > 0, but sufficiently small, there is a steady-state equilibrium path
with
ρ∗(r) =
(2 + e) +
√
(2 + e)2 − 4(2− θ)(e+ θ
1−θe
a)
2(2− θ) − 1 > 0.
By a standard argument, there is no equilibrium path with ρ0 6∈ [ρ¯(r), ρ∗
(r)], where ρ¯(r) = [(2 + e) −√(2 + e)2 − 4(2− θ)(e+ θ/(1− θ)ea)]/[2(2 −
θ)]− 1 < 0.
For ρ(t) ∈ [ρ¯(r), ρ∗(r)], real balances are bounded below by µa(ρ¯(r)) > 0
and, as a consequence, the value of the bank is well defined and, in particular
finite, only if ρ(t) > 0.
Since ρ(t) → ρ¯(r) < 0 if ρ(t) ∈ [ρ¯(r), ρ∗(r)), the steady-state at ρ∗(r) is
the unique equilibrium path.
Importantly,
lim
r→0
ρ∗(r) = ρ∗;
as the nominal rate of interest tends to 0, the unique, steady-state real rate
of interest tends to the golden rule and the associated allocation to a Pareto
optimum.
The argument fails in the absence of intragenerational heterogeneity,
when real balances need not be bounded away from zero as the economy
tends to autarky.
Alternatively, Weiss (1980) allows real balances to enter directly the in-
tertemporal utility function of a representative individual, u(x, z, µ), and he
writes the intertemporal budget constraint as
xt +
1
1 + ρ
(zt+1 − e) + rt − pit
1 + rt
µt ≤ 0,
which follows from the hypothesis that changes in the supply of balances are
distributed as lump-sum transfers to individuals when old.
At a steady-state, optimization requires that
uµ
ux
=
r
1 + r
,
while market clearing requires that
r − pi
1 + r
µi =
r − pi
1 + r
(z − e);
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the outstanding debt is
b = (z − e) + µ.
At equilibria with debt, r = pi and ρ = 0. As a consequence, the liquidity
services that balances, distinct from debt, provide, do not shield the economy
from intertemporal inefficiency.
Alternatively, without debt (or, equivalently, if debt provides liquidity ser-
vices and is not distinguishable from money), µ = z − e and, with pi = 0 the
real rate of interest is necessarily positive, ρ = r > 0, which, indeed, guar-
antees intertemporal efficiency. The hypothesis of non-vanishing marginal
utility for money balances plays a role similar to that of intragenerational
heterogeneity in our construction, but the logic of the arguments is different.
2.2
Two perishable commodities, l ∈ N = {a, b}, are exchanged and consumed
at each date. Individual i only consumes commodity i, but is endowed with
one unit of the other commodity, −i, when young and nothing when old.
The intertemporal utility function of an individual i is
ui
(
xi, zi
)
= xi + 2zi,
where xi and zi are the consumptions of the individual in commodity i,
respectively, when young and when old.
The price of commodity i at date t in present value terms is pit. The
constant nominal rate of interest is r ≥ 0. An individual faces the single
budget constraint
pitx
i
t + p
i
t+1z
i
t+1 ≤
(
1
1 + r
)
p−it ,
which reflects an underlying cash-in-advance constraint. In addition, the
budget constraint of an initially old individual is
pi0z
i
0 ≤ µi
(
r
1 + r
)∑
t
(
pat + p
b
t
)
,
which reflects the hypothesis that the individual is entitled to a share µi ≥ 0
in intertemporal seignorage, so that µa + µb = 1.
Market clearing simply requires that
xit + z
i
t = 1.
At equilibrium, sequential Walras Law implies(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
pit +
∑
i
pit+1z
i
t+1 =
∑
i
pitz
i
t.
7
This completes the description of the economy.
Let θ = [r/(1 + r)] ≤ 1, for r ≥ 0. Reinterpreting terms, one might
suppose that every individual i with only 1− θ units of commodity −i when
young and nothing when old. In addition, a real productive asset i, initially
owned by old individuals, deliver  units of commodity i at every date.
We consider equilibria in two distinct cases.
First, r = 0. From the budget constraints of initially old individuals, it
follows that zi0 = 0 and, so, exploiting sequential Walras Law, that x
i
t = 1
and zit = 0 for every t. This requires p
i
t+1 ≥ 2pit for every t. The equilibrium
allocation clearly fails Pareto optimality.
Alternatively, r > 0. From the budget constraints of initially old individ-
uals, it follows that
pi0z
i
0 = µ
i
(
r
1 + r
)∑
t
(
pat + p
b
t
)
,
and, as a consequence, that
∑
t
(
pat + p
b
t
)
is finite. By a canonical argument,
the equilibrium allocation achieves Pareto optimality. We show that a steady
state equilibrium exists under an equal distribution of seignorage, µa = µb.
Assume that xit = 0 and z
i
t = 1 for every t. To obtain equilibrium prices,
observe that, from the budget constraints of young individuals,
pit+1 =
(
1
1 + r
)
p−it ,
while, from the budget constraints of initially old individuals, p0 = p
a
0 = p
b
0;
it follows that
pt = p
a
t = p
b
t =
(
1
1 + r
)t
p0,
at every date t.
For an arbitrary distribution of seignorage, a steady state equilibrium
might not exist. To verify this, observe that, at a stationary equilibrium,
xit = x
i and zit = z
i for every t, with xi + zi = 1. If xi > 0, by utility
maximization, pit+1 ≥ 2pit, which would violate the fact that
∑
t
(
pat + p
b
t
)
is
finite. Hence, xi = 0, which implies, by the budget constraint of a young
individual and utility maximization,
2pit ≥ pit+1 =
(
1
1 + r
)
p−it .
In addition, an initial condition requires
pi0 = µ
i
(
r
1 + r
)∑
t
(
pat + p
b
t
)
.
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From both conditions, it follows that
2µb ≥
(
1
1 + r
)
µa
and
2µa ≥
(
1
1 + r
)
µb.
Hence, a stationary equilibrium might not exist for an arbitrary distribution
of shares — well known for (stationary) economies of overlapping generations
with multiple individuals in each generation and multiple commodities.
This example is designed to deliver an extremely clear conclusion about
efficiency at equilibrium. In particular, a simplifying assumption, that each
individual is endowed only with the commodity that he does not consume,
eliminates price distortions due to cash-in-advance constraints, which only
operates through pure wealth effects. Within each generation, there are
actually infinite gains to trade, as young individuals are clearly better off by
exchanging their endowments. Intergenerational trade allows for a further
increase in welfare.
3 The Abstract Argument
There is a countable set of individuals, I = {. . . , i, . . .}, a countable set of
periods of trade, T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t, . . .}, and a finite set of physical com-
modities in every period of trade, N . The commodity space is L = RL,
where L = T × N .5
The consumption space of an individual is L+, the positive cone of the
commodity space, and an element, xi, of the consumption space is a con-
sumption plan. An individual is characterized by a preference relation, i,
5The set of all real valued maps on L is L = RL. An element x of L is said to be
positive if x (l) ≥ 0 for every l in L; negligible if x (l) = 0 for all but finitely many l in
L. For an element x of L, x+ and x− are, respectively, its positive part and its negative
part, so that x = x+−x− and |x| = x+ +x−. The positive cone, L+, of L consists of all
positive elements of L. Also, L0 is the vector space consisting of all negligible elements of
L. Finally, for every element x of L,
L (x) = {v ∈ L : |v| ≤ λ |x| , for some λ > 0}
is a principal ideal of L. Unless otherwise stated, every topological property on L refers
to the traditional product topology. We remark that, throughout the paper, the term
‘positive’ is used to mean ‘greater than or equal to zero’.
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on the consumption space and an endowment, ei, of commodities, an ele-
ment of the consumption space itself. He is also entitled to a share µi ≥ 0 of
aggregate revenue, so that, across individuals,
∑
i µ
i = 1.
Fundamentals, (. . . , (i, ei, µi) , . . .), are restricted by canonical assump-
tions, so that every single individual is negligible. The aggregate endowment
is
∑
i e
i, which is understood to be a limit in the product topology.
Assumption 1 (Preferences). The preference relations of individuals are
convex, continuous, weakly monotone and locally non-satiated.
Assumption 2 (Endowments). The endowments of individuals are positive,
negligible elements of the commodity space.
Assumption 3 (Aggregate Endowment). The aggregate endowment is a
positive element of the commodity space.
An allocation, x = (. . . ,xi, . . .), is a collection of consumption plans. It
is balanced whenever
∑
i x
i =
∑
i e
i. It is feasible whenever
∑
i x
i ≤∑i ei.
It is individually rational whenever, for every individual i, xi i ei. For a
feasible allocation x, aggregate consumption,
∑
i x
i, is an element of L (e),
where e =
∑
i e
i is the aggregate endowment.
Trade occurs intertemporally subject to transaction costs. In an abstract
formulation, it simplifies matters to assume that individuals can only trade
if they deliver a value that is proportional to the value of their net trans-
actions. Such revenues from transactions accrue to a central authority that
redistributes them to individuals as lump-sum transfers, according to given
shares. This abstraction corresponds to the description of a sequential mon-
etary economy under a complete asset market and a central bank that pegs
a constant nominal rate of interest and accommodates the demand for bal-
ances. In addition, the central bank, whose ownership is sequentially trade on
the asset market, redistributes its profit (seignorage) as dividends to share-
holders.
Prices of commodities p are also an element of L+. These are, in a sense,
discounted or Arrow-Debreu prices. The duality operation on L+ × L+ is
defined by
p · v = sup {p · v0 : v0 ∈ [0,v] ∩L0} ,
that may be infinite.
The budget constraint of an individual is(
r
1 + r
)
p · (xi − ei)− + p · (xi − ei) ≤ µiw,
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where µi ≥ 0 is the share of the individual i in the aggregate positive transfer
w.
For given a positive nominal rate of interest, r, an (abstract) r-equilibrium
consists of a balanced allocation, x, prices, p, and a aggregate positive trans-
fer, w, such that (
r
1 + r
)
p ·
∑
i
(
xi − ei)− ≤ w
and, for every individual,(
r
1 + r
)
p · (xi − ei)− + p · (xi − ei) ≤ µiw
and
zi i xi =⇒
(
r
1 + r
)
p · (zi − ei)− + p · (zi − ei) > µiw.
An (abstract) r-equilibrium involves a speculative bubble if
b = w −
(
r
1 + r
)
p ·
∑
i
(
xi − ei)− > 0.
Notice that an (abstract) 0-equilibrium is what the literature traditionally
refers to as an equilibrium with (possibly) positive outside money, or with
(possibly) a positive speculative bubble.
Lemma 1. The value of net transaction, p ·∑i (xi − ei)−, is finite at every
r-equilibrium with r > 0.
Proof. Obvious. Q.E.D.
Allocation z Pareto dominates allocation x if, for every individual, zi i
xi with zi i xi for some. Allocation z Malinvaud dominates allocation x
if z Pareto dominates x, while zi = xi for all but finitely many individuals
(Malinvaud (1953)).
For a given positive nominal rate of interest, r, an allocation, x, is Pareto
(Malinvaud) r-undominated if it is not Pareto (Malinvaud) dominated by an
alternative allocation, z, that satisfies(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
(
zi − ei)− +∑
i
zi ≤
(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
(
xi − ei)− +∑
i
xi.
Evidently, a Pareto (Malinvaud) 0-undominated allocation coincides with a
standard Pareto (Malinvaud) efficient allocation.
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Lemma 2. Every r-equilibrium allocation is a Malinvaud r-undominated
allocation.
Proof. If not, there is an allocation z that Malinvaud dominates allocation
x and satisfies(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
(
zi − ei)− +∑
i
zi ≤
(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
(
xi − ei)− +∑
i
xi.
Thus, for every individual,(
r
1 + r
)
p · (zi − ei)− + p · zi ≥ ( r
1 + r
)
p · (xi − ei)− + p · xi,
with at least one strict inequality. Since the allocation z coincides with
the allocation x for all but finitely many individuals, aggregation across
individuals yields a contradiction. Q.E.D.
An allocation, x, involves uniform trade if there is a decomposition Lf ⊕
Lb of the (reduced) commodity space L (e), with
Lf ⊆
{
v ∈ L : |v| ≤ λ
∑
i
(
xi − ei)− , for some λ > 0} ,
and an allocation v such that
∑
i v
i belongs to L (e) and, for some λ >
0 small enough, xi − λxib + vif i xi for every individual. This requires
that the set of commodities can be partitioned into commodities that are
traded in some uniformly strictly positive amount and commodities that are
not, in such a way that all individuals can increase their welfare by a large
enough increase in consumption in the former set of commodities, even when
consumption in the latter set of commodities is slightly reduced.
Assumption 4 (Gains to Trade). Every individually rational balanced
Malinvaud r-undominated allocation, with r > 0 sufficiently small, involves
uniform trade.
The gains to trade hypothesis extends the condition Bloise, Dre`ze and
Polemarchakis (2004) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2005). It has as conse-
quence that the value of the aggregate endowment is finite at equilibrium.
Lemma 3. The value of the aggregate endowment, p·∑i ei, is finite at every
r-equilibrium with r > 0 sufficiently small.
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Proof. Consider the decomposition of the (reduced) commodity space Lf ⊕
Lb = L (e) ⊆ L in the hypothesis of a uniform trade. Clearly, p defines a
positive σ-additive linear functional on Lf . Thus, p ·
∑
i e
i is unbounded
only if p ·∑i eib is unbounded and, hence, only if p ·∑i xib is unbounded.
Also, p ·∑i vif is finite, where v is the allocation mentioned in the definition
of uniform trade.
For every individual, zi i xi implies(
r
1 + r
)
p · (zi − ei)− + p · zi ≥ ( r
1 + r
)
p · (xi − ei)− + p · xi.
Since (zi − xi)− + (xi − ei)− ≥ (zi − ei)−, it follows that
p · (zi − xi)+ ≥ ( 1
1 + r
)
p · (zi − xi)− .
As xi−λxib+vif i xi for some λ > 0 sufficiently small, using the previous
argument, with zi = xi − λxib + vif implies that
p · vif ≥
(
1
1 + r
)
λp · xib.
Aggregation across individuals yields a contradiction. Q.E.D.
As the aggregate endowment is finitely valued at equilibrium, canonical
conclusions about efficiency and the absence of speculative bubbles can be
drawn.
Proposition 1 (Almost Pareto Optimality). No r-equilibrium allocati-
on, x, with r > 0 sufficiently small, is Pareto dominated by an alternative
allocation, z, that satisfies∑
i
zi ≤
(
1
1 + r
)∑
i
ei.
Proof. As the aggregate endowment is finitely valued, it is clear that every
r-equilibrium allocation, with r > 0 small enough, is a Pareto r-undominated
allocation (the proof is just an adaptation of the proof of lemma 2). So, in
order to prove that the statement in the proposition holds true, suppose not.
It follows that x is Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z that
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satisfies(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
(
zi − ei)− +∑
i
zi ≤(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
ei +
∑
i
zi ≤
∑
i
ei
≤
(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
(
xi − ei)− +∑
i
xi.
This contradicts Pareto r-undomination. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 (No Speculative Bubbles). No r-equilibrium, with r > 0
sufficiently small, involves a speculative bubble.
Proof. As the aggregate endowment is finitely valued, the result follows
from the aggregation of budget constraints across individuals. Q.E.D.
It remains to understand the restrictions implied by the gains to trade
hypothesis (assumption 4).
4 Gains to Trade in a Stationary Economy
The hypothesis on gains to trade (assumption 4) is generically satisfied in
a standard stationary economy of identical overlapping generations of het-
erogenous individuals. We shall simply provide the core argument, as details
are straightforward but heavy in terms of notation.
The set of individuals is I = J × T , where T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t, . . .} are
dates or periods of trade and J is a finite set of individuals within a gener-
ation: for every t in T , It = {(j, t) : j ∈ J } is generation t. All generations
It+1 are identical and have life spans T t+1 = {t, t+ 1} ⊆ T . The initial
generation I0 has life span T 0 = {0} ⊆ T .
Preferences are strictly monotone over the life span of an individual: for
an individual in generation t in T , preferences are strictly monotone on the
positive cone of Lt = RLt ⊆ RL = L, where Lt = T t ×N .
Endow the (reduced) commodity space L (e) with the supremum norm
‖v‖∞ = sup {λ > 0 : |v| ≤ λe} .
As the economy is stationary, this involves no loss of generality. Suppose that
there is  > 0 such that, for every individually rational, balanced, Malinvaud
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efficient allocation, x, the aggregate net trade of every generation t in T is
-bounded away from autarky, that is,∥∥∥∥∥∑
i∈It
(
xi − ei)+∥∥∥∥∥
∞
> .
In a stationary economy of identical overlapping generations, this is a rather
weak requirement when there are at least two individuals in each genera-
tion.6 It follows that there is  > 0 such that, provided that r > 0 is small
enough, for every individually rational, balanced, Malinvaud r-undominated
allocation, x, the aggregate net trade of every generation t in T is -bounded
away from autarky.
This is evident.
Let el be the aggregate endowment of commodity l in L (regarded as an
element of the commodity space L). For a generation t in T , let g (t) in L
be a commodity such that
eg(t) ≤ 1

∑
i∈It
(
xi − ei)+ .
Such a commodity exists because net trades are uniformly bounded away (in
the sup norm) from zero by  > 0. Decompose the aggregate endowment as
e = ef + eb, where
ef =
∑
l∈g(T )
el,
and
eb =
∑
l 6∈g(T )
el.
Clearly, Lf = L (ef ) and Lb = L (eb) are such that L (e) = Lf ⊕ Lb. In
addition,
ef ≤∑
t∈T eg(t) ≤ 1
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈It (x
i − ei)+ =
1

∑
i (x
i − ei)+ = 1

∑
i (x
i − ei)− ,
6As the allocation is Malinvaud efficient, it is Pareto efficient within every generation.
As the allocation is individually rational and preferences are strictly monotone, if positive
net trades vanish within a generation, so do negative net trades. Thus, using the fact that
all generations are identical,  > 0 above does not exist only if no-trade is a Pareto efficient
allocation within a typical generation. This does not occur generically in preferences and
endowments.
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so that
Lf ⊆
{
v ∈ L : |v| ≤ λ
∑
i
(
xi − ei)− , for some λ > 0} .
For an individual i in generation t in T , let vi = vif = eg(t). Taking into
account multiplicities and using the fact that generations overlap for at most
two periods, it is easily verified that∑
i
vi =
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈It
eg(t) ≤ (#J )
∑
t∈T
eg(t) ≤ 2 (#J )
∑
l∈g(T )
el = 2 (#J ) ef .
Using stationarity hypotheses and the strict monotonicity of preferences over
relevant consumption spaces, it is simple to show that there is 1 > λ > 0
such that, for every individual,
xi − λxib + vif i xi.
The gains to trade hypothesis (assumption 4) is satisfied.
5 Sequential Trade
The abstract framework accommodates a sequential economy of overlapping
generations. We here present the classical arguments for the consolidation of
budget constraints that are implied by a sequentially complete asset market.
5.1 Prices and Markets
In every period of trade, there are markets for commodities, balances and as-
sets. Balances are the nume´raire at every date. A constant positive nominal
rate of interest, r, is pegged by the monetary authority.7
The asset structure consists of a one-period nominally risk-free bond and
an infinitely-lived security that pays off nominal dividends in every period.
7As far as individuals and commodities are concerned, notation is as in section 3. In
particular, an element x of L = RT ×N decomposes, across periods of trade, as
x = (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt, xt+1, . . .) ,
where each xt is an element of RN ; an element x of E = RT decomposes, across periods
of trade, as
x = (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt, xt+1, . . .) ,
where each xt is an element of R.
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Short sales are allowed on bonds, but not on the security. Prices of the
security q are a positive element ofE = RT . These are spot prices. Dividends
of the security y are a positive element of E. This security is in positive net
supply and, to simplify, the supply is normalized to the unity.
Discount factors, a, a positive element of E, are obtained by setting
at =
(
1
1 + r
)t
.
No arbitrage, jointly with the fact that the security cannot be dominated by
bonds at equilibrium, implies that, in every period of trade,
atqt = atyt + at+1qt+1.
This condition reflects the innocuous assumption that the security is priced
cum dividend. As far as the intertemporal transfer of wealth is concerned,
bonds and the security are perfect substitutes under this no-arbitrage pricing.
A standard argument implies that, in every period of trade,
qt ≥ 1
at
∑
s≥t
asys.
That is, the price of the security is at equal to or greater than its funda-
mental value. The displacement of the market value of the security from its
fundamental value is the speculative bubble.
Prices of commodities p are a positive element of L. To avoid an excess of
notation, we interpret p as present value prices of commodities. So, current
(or spot) prices of commodities are(
1
a0
p0, . . . ,
1
at−1
pt−1,
1
at
pt,
1
at+1
pt+1, . . .
)
.
5.2 Sequential Budget Constraints
Sequential constraints are canonical. Individual i formulates a consumption
plan, xi, a positive element of L, and a financial plan, (mi, zi,vi), consisting
of holdings of balances, mi, a positive element of E, of the security, zi, a
positive element of E, and of short-term bonds, vi, an element of L. Indi-
vidual i enters period of trade t with some accumulated nominal wealth, wit;
he trades in assets and balances according to the budget constraint
mit + (qt − yt) zit +
(
1
1 + r
)
vit ≤ wit;
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he uses balances for the purchase of commodities, as prescribed by a cash-
in-advance constraint,
1
at
pt ·
(
xit − eit
)− ≤ mit;
receives balances from the sale of commodities and he enters the following
period of trade t+ 1 with nominal wealth
wit+1 = m
i
t + qt+1z
i
t + v
i
t −
1
at
pt ·
(
xit − eit
)
.
In addition, a wealth constraint of the form
− 1
at+1
∑
s≥t+1
ps · eis ≤ wit+1
is imposed in order to avoid Ponzi schemes. Finally, the initial nominal
wealth is given by the initial price of the security, wi0 = µ
iq0, where µ
i ≥ 0 is
the initial share of individual i into the security.
If a consumption plan, xi, and a financial plan, (mi, zi,vi), satisfy all the
above described restrictions at all periods of trade, we say that financial plan
(mi, zi,vi) finances consumption plan xi (equivalently, consumption plan xi
is financed by financial plan (mi, zi,vi)). The sequential budget constraint
of individual i is the set of all consumption plans, xi, that are financed by
some financial plan.
Literally interpreted, our sequential budget constraint might appear con-
tradicting the hypothesis of overlapping generations of individuals. Indeed,
it can be argued that an individual might not be active at some date and,
so, it is meaningless to assume that consumptions and wealth accumulation
of such an individual are restricted by the entire sequence of constrains. Ob-
serve, however, that an individual should be regarded as not being active
at some date only if he has no endowment of commodities and his utility is
unaffected by the consumption of commodities at that date. These are joint
assumptions of preferences and endowments. Letting the individual trade
when he should be regarded as not being active adds redundant constraints
without altering the substance. A skeptical reader might assume that an
individual i is characterized by a time horizon T i ⊆ T of consecutive periods
of trade. Both the consumption plan and the financial plan can be assumed
to be zero out of the given time horizon. In the same spirit of the above
observation, one might be willing to assume that the initial share into the
security is strictly positive only for individuals that are active in the initial
period of trade.
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5.3 Intertemporal Budget Constraints
By a canonical consolidation, provided that there are no arbitrage opportu-
nities, sequential budget constraint reduces to a single intertemporal budget
constraint of the form(
r
1 + r
)∑
t
pt ·
(
xit − eit
)−
+
∑
t
pt ·
(
xit − eit
) ≤ µiq0.
The underlying demand of balances satisfies, in every period of trade t,
mit ≥
1
at
pt ·
(
xit − eit
)−
,
with the equality whenever r > 0. Also, the holding of bonds and of the
security, witch are perfect substitutes as far as intertemporal transfers of
wealth are concerned, can be assumed to satisfy, in every period of trade t,
mit + qt+1z
i
t + v
i
t =
(
r
1 + r
)
1
at
∑
s≥t+1
(
xis − eis
)−
+
1
at
∑
s≥t
ps ·
(
xis − eis
)
.
As a matter of mere fact, using a more compact notation, a consumption
plan, xi, is restrict by a single intertemporal budget constraint of the form(
r
1 + r
)
p · (xi − ei)− + p · (xi − ei) ≤ µiq0.
The financial plan, (mi, zi,vi), that finances an intertemporally budget fea-
sible consumption plan, xi, can be recovered, up to an intrinsic multiplicity
due to redundant assets.
5.4 The Monetary Authority
The security is backed by the ownership of a central bank, which issues
balances against bonds and distributes its profit as a divided to shareholders.
A plan, (m,v,y), of the monetary authority consists of a supply of balances,
m, a positive element of E, a demand of short-term bonds, v, an element of
E, and dividends to shareholders, y, a positive element of E. A sequential
budget constraint imposes
m−
(
1
1 + r
)
v = y.
The monetary authority accommodates the demand for balances (that is,
m =
∑
im
i) and runs balanced accounts (that is, m = v), so that
y =
(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
mi.
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5.5 Sequential Equilibrium
Equilibrium requires market clearing only for commodities and assets, as the
demand of balances is accommodated by the monetary authority. Given a
positive nominal rate of interest, r, a sequential r-equilibrium consists of a
collection of plans for individuals,(
. . . ,
(
xi,
(
mi, zi,vi
))
, . . .
)
,
a plan for the monetary authority, (m,v,y), prices, p, and security prices,
q, such that the following conditions are satisfied.
(a) For every individual i, consumption plan xi is i-optimal, subject to
sequential budget constraint, and is financed by financial plan (mi, zi,
vi).
(b) The monetary authority accommodates the demand for balances and
runs a balanced budget or
m =
∑
i
mi,
v = m,
y =
(
r
1 + r
)
m.
(c) Markets for commodities and assets clear or∑
i
xi =
∑
i
ei,∑
i
zi = 1,∑
i
vi = v.
Clearly, at a sequential equilibrium, security prices involve no arbitrage op-
portunities and, in addition, the security is not dominated by bonds.
5.6 Abstraction
At equilibrium,(
r
1 + r
)
mt =
(
r
1 + r
)
1
at
pt ·
∑
i
(
xit − eit
)+
=
(
r
1 + r
)
1
at
pt ·
∑
i
(
xit − eit
)−
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and, as a consequence,(
r
1 + r
)∑
t
pt ·
∑
i
(
xit − eit
)−
=
∑
t
atyt ≤ q0.
Thus, using consolidation of sequential budget constraints, at a (sequential)
r-equilibrium, it follows that(
r
1 + r
)
p ·
∑
i
(
xi − ei)− ≤ q0
and, for every individual i,(
r
1 + r
)
p · (xi − ei)− + p · (xi − ei) ≤ µiq0
and
zi i xi implies
(
r
1 + r
)
p · (zi − ei)− + p · (zi − ei) > µiq0.
These are the only substantial equilibrium restrictions, as market clearing for
bonds and the security can be verified to hold. As a conclusion, a sequential
r-equilibrium coincides with an abstract r-equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the abstract formulation, every individual i is subject to a single budget
constraint of the form(
r
1 + r
)
p · (xi − ei)− + p · (xi − ei) ≤ wi,
where wi would be interpreted, depending on the particular institutional
framework, as the value of initial asset holdings plus possibly transfers in
present value terms. Thus, Walras Law imposes
f + b =
(
r
1 + r
)∑
i
p · (xi − ei)− +∑
i
p · (xi − ei) = ∑
i
wi = w,
where w, f and b are understood to be (possibly non-finite) limits.8 The
argument for almost Pareto optimality moves from the observation that the
8The discussion here is only suggestive, so that we avoid details on conditions for well-
defined, though not finite, limits.
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value of net transactions is finite at equilibrium. As long as nominal rate of
interest is strictly positive, r > 0, this occurs whenever f is finite. In addition,
by local non-satiation of preferences, w is finite if at least one individual is
entitled to a positive share of it (that is, wi = αiw, with αi > 0, for some
individual i).
If w is finite, then
w ≥
(
r
1 + r
)
p ·
∑
i
(
xi − ei)− = f
suffices to argue that f is finite. Incidentally, the above inequality rules out
a negative speculative bubble, w − f = b ≥ 0, but the crucial point is only
that it guarantees a finite value of f . Sequential trades and, in particular, a
central bank quoted on the stock market serve to interpret w as the initial
market value of the central bank and f as the initial fundamental value
of the central bank. Thus, w ≥ f , with w finite, is inherited by a primitive
description of sequential trades under the assumption of free disposal on long-
term securities, so as to rule out a negative market value of the central bank.
Could the same conclusion be drawn in other institutional frameworks?
In Bloise, Dre`ze and Polemarchakis (2004), a central bank trades bal-
ances for bonds and runs a balanced account by redistributing its profit to
shareholders. This basically requires f = w, which by itself does not ensure
a finite value of f . However, if this redistribution of the profit is interpreted
as occurring intertemporally (that is, shares are into the intertemporal value
of seignorage w), w would be finite and conclusions would be equivalent.
Alternatively, in the spirit of the fiscal theory of price determination
(Woodford (1994)), one interprets w as a given stock on public debt, which
is, thus, finite. A priori, it does not follow that w ≥ f , which inciden-
tally shows that the price level might still be indeterminate (in that context,
f = w implies an intertemporally balanced public budget). However, if one
assumes that public debt cannot be negative, with ambiguous implications
for sequential public budget constrains, then b ≥ 0 and, so, w ≥ f , thus
leading to analogous conclusions.
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